Evaluation research is tortured by time constraints. The policy cycle revolves more quickly than the research cycle, with the result that 'real time' evaluations often have little influence on policy making. As a result, the quest for evidence-based policy (EBP) has turned increasingly to systematic reviews of the results of previous inquiries in the relevant policy domain. However, this shifting of the temporal frame for evaluation is in itself no guarantee of success. Evidence, whether new or old, never speaks for itself. Accordingly, there is debate about the best strategy of marshalling bygone research results into the policy process. In the first of this pair of articles (published in the previous issue of Evaluation) a critical review of the existing EBP strategies was conducted. This companion article considers the merits of a new methodology for systematic reviews, namely 'realist synthesis'. K E Y WO R D S : evidence-based policy; incentives; realism; systematic review
Introduction
The purpose of this article is to sketch out a fresh approach to evidence-based policy (EBP), which I will call 'realist synthesis'. Though realist inquiry has a long pedigree in social science (Keat and Urry, 1975) and philosophy (Bhaskar, 1979) , it is a relatively new strategy in evaluation research, which has only recently gained a foothold on both sides of the Atlantic (Pawson and Tilley, 1997; Henry et al., 1998) . The realist approach is not an evaluation technique as such, but a framework for the whole enterprise. It is being developed to encompass programmes of all types (local to transnational) and evaluation tasks of all modes (developmental to impact assessment). This article widens this net to include the domain of 'meta-analysis', 'systematic review' and 'research synthesis', from which potential set of labels I draw upon the latter because it is suggestive of the coming together of programme theories which, as we shall see, is at the heart of realist ambitions.
My first task is to introduce some themes from the first of the articles, which considered the existing, mainstream methods for conducting systematic research review; these are 'numerical meta-analysis' and 'narrative review'. In the first article, I argued that these differed, not only in technical terms but also with respect to the understanding of the basic 'logic' of the EBP process. That logic contains the following three vital elements.
• Causation Systematic review seeks to differentiate influential interventions from impotent initiatives. To do so involves some understanding of the 'causal powers' of a programme. Review methodology thus always carries a model of how programmes achieve their effects.
• Ontology This conception of how programmes actually work provides an ontology for the review process -a list of vital 'ingredients' that should be sought in and extracted from each original study.
• Generalization Finally, review methodology will take a view on the nature of knowledge transference. How can we generalize from the evidence base? How are we to capture the lessons learned in a way that informs future policy and practice?
These factors embody the domain methodological assumptions of EBP and they allow us to differentiate the orthodox approaches as follows.
Meta-analysis
This assumes a 'successionist' conception of causality; programmes are themselves presumed to have causal powers. The method has evolved from evidence-based medicine in which it is assumed that different 'treatments' carry the potential for change. Thus in terms of review ontology, metaanalysis calls for two things: careful classification of the programmes under review and a clear map of their effects. These are combined in the search for reliable measures of the net effect of different types of programme and meta-analysis thus prefers a baseline of studies using randomized controlled trials. In terms of generalization, the goal is 'heterogeneous replication'. The review will seek out sub-types of programmes that have worked to maximum effect on the widest scale. Knowledge transfer is a matter of identifying and imitating the most powerful classes of programmes (or eliminating the most dangerous).
Narrative review This utilizes a 'configurational' approach to causality, in which outcomes are considered to follow from the alignment of a fruitful combination of attributes. Programmes work because of the compatibility of target group, setting, programme stratagem, programme content, implementation details, stakeholder alliances and so on. Such factors, along with information on outcomes and on the methodology employed in the original evaluations constitute the ontology of narrative review. In terms of generalization, the goal is 'proximal similarity'. The idea is to learn from review by following the successful programmes. What makes them successful is the juxtaposition of the above features and so any future programme design should attempt to imitate the programme as a whole or at least try to gather in as many similarities as possible.
There is a considerable gap between these two perspectives and this article argues that developing a third model along realist lines can fill it and fill it, moreover, in a way that brings advantages to the policy maker. The following section will spell out the logic of realist synthesis in some detail but I can anticipate the main arguments for the reader with a brief rehearsal using the template above.
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Realist synthesis This utilizes a 'generative' approach to causation. According to this perspective it is not 'programmes' that work: rather it is the underlying reasons or resources that they offer subjects that generate change. Causation is also reckoned to be contingent. Whether the choices or capacities on offer in an initiative are acted upon depends on the nature of their subjects and the circumstances of the initiative. The vital ingredients of programme ontology are thus its 'generative mechanisms' and its 'contiguous context'. Data extraction in realist synthesis thus takes the form of an interrogation of the baseline inquiries for information on 'what works for whom in what circumstances'. The approach to generalization is also different. The policy community is not offered a 'best buy' (approach 'x' or case 'y' seems to be the most successful) but a tailored, 'transferable theory' (this programme theory works in these respects, for these subjects, in these kinds of situations).
The section 'Incentives' is a thumbnail sketch of realist synthesis in action. It provides an overview of a small range of very different interventions that have traded on the oldest policy idea of all, namely the 'incentive'. It concludes by pulling together some elemental, transferable lessons for any future policy maker brave or foolhardy enough to contemplate the offer of a 'grant', 'give-away' or 'subsidy'.
The Logic of Realist Synthesis
In formal terms (Pawson and Tilley, 1997) , the realist interpretation of programme efficacy is expressed as follows. The causal power of an initiative lies in its underlying mechanism (M), namely its basic theory about how programme resources will influence the subject's actions. Whether this mechanism is actually triggered depends on context (C), the characteristics of both the subjects and the programme locality. Programmes, especially over the course of a number of trials, will therefore have diverse impacts over a range of effects, a feature known as the outcome pattern (O). This explanatory ensemble is depicted in the upper portion of Figure 1 .
Following this logic gives us a different focus on the review process. The entry point is perhaps the most significant point of departure. Realism adopts a 'generative' understanding of causation. What this tries to break is the lazy linguistic habit of basing evaluation on the question of whether 'programmes work'. In fact, it is not programmes that work but the resources they offer to enable their subjects to make them work. This process of how subjects interpret the intervention stratagem is known as the programme 'mechanism' and it is the pivot around which realist evaluation revolves. So, to take up an example that will detain us later, let us consider the causal powers of programmes offering 'transitional payments' to prisoners on release with the aim of preventing the need for a quick return to crime. In such cases, it is not the programme that causes 'rehabilitation'. It merely provides payments, which the subjects choose to use in different ways, one of which might be to steer away from crime.
Such reasoning provides an important result for EBP. Since it is 'programme mechanisms' that trigger change rather than 'programmes' as such, then it is much Figure 1 . Realist Synthesis more sensible to base any systematic review on 'families of mechanisms' rather than on 'families of programmes'. This gives realist synthesis a completely different locus of comparison from the other methods of systematic review. The starting point is to refrain from tackling original evaluations that belong to particular 'families of interventions' (e.g. the 'n' means of tackling offender rehabilitation -'incentives', 'probation', 'cognitive skills training', 'anger management' and so on). Rather, realist synthesis takes on 'families of mechanisms' (e.g. the same programme theory, say 'incentivization', implemented across the domains of health, education, crime, welfare, employment and so on).
Negative instances Positive instances
The importance of such a strategy is that it solves one of the key dilemmas of systematic review, namely that of achieving a proper comparison of 'like with like'. I have argued in the first of these articles that using the 'administrative domain' as the unit of analysis throws together some unlikely bedfellows. Durlak and Wells' (1997) meta-analysis of Primary Prevention Mental Health (PPMH) programmes included a whole spectrum from 'peer-encouragement through a life crisis' to 'changing the school curriculum'. Towner et al.'s (1996) review on reducing childhood accidents included everything from the provision of 'free smoke alarms' to 'school-based road safety education initiatives'. The crucial point for the realist is that all such variants are expected to 'work' through the use of totally different programme mechanisms.
I have already covered in detail the difficulty of trying to apply the same yardstick to quite diverse PPMH programme theories. For emphasis, let me repeat the 'chalk and cheese' argument with respect to the pair of safety programmes. A free smoke alarm is obviously a 'give-away'. The intended mechanism is simply to make available a resource that the subjects do not possess and it will work if those subjects are persuaded to accept, install, maintain and act upon it. School road-safety education, like any classroom activity, depends on the mechanism of the 'passing on of wisdom' -in this case in the form of codes about behaviour in traffic. It works if the children are able to recall and apply general rules in the hurly-burly of a specific street situation.
It is very difficult to make the case that meaningful comparisons are being made in placing 'incentive-giving' alongside 'rule-following'. To be sure they may both end up saving children's lives. And it is probably the case that rough-andready actuarial calculations could be made about the costs and benefits of the respective schemes in terms of this outcome. But they are not in any way genuine policy alternatives. There could be no empirical basis for switching resources from one to another. Thus for the realist, more meaningful juxtapositions are obtained if we take the programme mechanism as the locus of comparison. In common sense terms, this amounts to saying that more consequential lessons are to be learned if we try to test out the same policy idea by seeing how it turns out in diverse settings. Programmes begin life in the heads of policy makers; it is these ideas that research review seeks to sharpen and only sensible therefore that these ideas should be the source of comparison. Accordingly, in terms of some of the many measures identified above, the starting point would be to note that, e.g. 'peer-education' is a promising idea used throughout mental health, crime and, of course, education programmes, and then to try to discover its most beneficial
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applications. Likewise give-aways have been applied to almost every policy domain and to many, many problems apart from smoke detection, and another meaningful EBP exercise would be to discover the optimal set of circumstances for 'incentives' to be put to good use.
Having established the basic scope of realist synthesis, let us move to the next issue of methodological contention, which concerns the nature of the comparison to be affected. Here, I am seeking an alternative to meta-analysis's comparisons of net effects and narrative review's attempts to make holistic comparisons. What ingredients are brought to the table for comparison in realist synthesis? The basic strategy is depicted in the main body of Figure 1 and it is based upon following the fortunes of the dominant mechanism (M), through which it is assumed that a programme works. Realism assumes that each time a programme mechanism is brought into operation, it will meet with both success and failure. Programme A is then reviewed with the aim of trying to distinguish for which subjects and in which circumstances it has been successful and unsuccessful. 'Success' is depicted throughout the figure by a solid line and 'failure', appropriately enough, is signalled by a dashed line. The reviewer's basic task is to sift through the mixed fortunes of the programme (both solid and dashed lines) attempting to discover those contexts (C + ) that have produced solid and successful outcomes (O + ) from those contexts (C -) that induce failure (O -).
The review process is then repeated across other initiatives featuring the same underlying mechanism with the aim of gathering together the various permutations of success and failure. In realist jargon, the aim is to differentiate and accumulate evidence on positive and negative CMO configurations. If all goes to plan, the ensuing policy advice will be to seek out the latter and avoid the former
The strategy involved in assembling and synthesizing this information also has several important and distinctive characteristics. In the first article it was noted that, in their different ways, both meta-analysis and narrative reviews focus in on 'best buys'. In realist synthesis, by contrast, negative and positive instances are equally important. Such a proposition has a home in common sense and in metaphysics. Mother's kindly exhortation, 'never mind dear, you can still learn from your mistakes', is also a good maxim for EBP -if adapted along the lines that the pursuit of successful policy depends as much on avoiding previous errors as by imitating successes. In the philosophy of science, the germ of the same idea lies at the base of Popper's (1959) theory of 'falsification'. In social science methodology, too, the negative instance has pride of place in the research strategy known as 'analytical induction' (Lindesmith, 1968) .
For Popper it is impossible to verify empirically a causal proposition that 'X is always followed by Y', because just waiting around the corner might be that yet undiscovered negative case. It is quite possible, on the other hand, to falsify this hypothesis by actually discovering such a negative instance. It follows, somewhat perversely, that progress in science is falsificationist. The hallmark of science, on this view, is the perpetual quest to put accepted theories to the severest test by trying to prove them wrong. Analytical induction is a reworking of the idea, which argues that the best way to sharpen up a theory is through the search for negative instances. For instance, if a theory has been developed that seems to be able to account for a class of phenomenon, it can be further strengthened by examining cases at the 'margins' of that class. The confrontation with a negative case forces one of two moves. Either one can make an adjustment to the original theory that broadens its scope, or one can say that the negative case falls outside the scope of the initial theory and some new hypothesis must be developed to cover the discrepant case. Here we encounter another mainstay of scientific practice, namely avoiding overstatement by paying careful attention to the boundaries of explanations.
Whilst such manoeuvres may sound horribly abstract, this business of the scope and boundaries of an explanation is absolutely crucial to evaluation methodology. Evaluation research has in the past lurched from over-optimism (and the search for universal panaceas) to despair (and the 'nothing works' lament). Somewhere in the middle lies the realistic aim. Programmes work in limited circumstances and for the realist, the discovery of these scope conditions is the main task of review and synthesis. This desideratum is especially important given that policy makers are often inveterate followers of fashion. Policy ideas do tend to move in waves. News of the success of 'naming and shaming' in A, is followed by the launch of 'naming and shaming' in B, C and D. 'Zero tolerance' of E begets zero tolerance of F, G, and H. Successful 'multi-agency working' in I has agents multiplying in J, K, L. Against this background, the discovery of cases of programme failure is every bit as important as locating successful outcomes. If we can discover where and why the bright idea fails, we have vital clues on when and how it can succeed. Such a strategy might indeed dampen some of the more violent trends in the uptake and out-take of initiatives.
Interestingly, Popper's idea has met with much resistance as a description of how scientists go about their business. Opponents of falsificationism have thought it unlikely that researchers would ever go about their experiments aiming to find negative cases in order to kill off their own brain-children. Real researchers, goes the counter argument, are verificationists and much prefer to be proven right! This little truism does not spell the end for the 'falsificationist spirit' however. The mistake is to think of it as a 'psychology' of research. It is not intended as a golden rule for the individual researcher: 'have a bright idea and go prove it wrong'. Rather it is about how cumulation of understanding occurs across the body of research and so it occurs collectively as the second researcher tries to correct the errors of the first, the third improves on the ideas of the second and so on. In other words falsification is a method of long-term knowledge resolution (Campbell, 1974) . As such, it occupies precisely the same domain as meta-analysis, review and synthesis and it is high time that the principle was formalized within the canon.
The next distinctive feature of a realist approach to review concerns the way the evidence is assembled together to reveal the policy lesson. Again, let me make the contrast pointedly.
1. Meta-analysis performs calculations to reveal 'best buys'. 2. Narrative review delivers text to understand 'exemplary cases'. 3. Realist synthesis delves into inconsistencies to build 'programme theories'.
The basic idea of systematic review is to draw transferable lessons from existing programmes and initiatives. Realist synthesis assumes that the transmission of lessons occurs through a process of theory building rather than assembling empirical generalizations. There is an obvious affinity here with the 'theory-driven' approaches to evaluation (Bickman, 1987; Chen and Rossi, 1992, Connell et al., 1995; Pawson and Tilley, 1997) . Each of these begins with the notion that programmes are conjectures taking the form, 'if we apply programme X this unleashes process Y, which will result in Z'. The task of evaluation by these lights is to gather evidence to see if the process occurs as planned and, if it should not, then to amend the theory to account for the divergent outcomes.
Realist synthesis accelerates this process around many, many cycles with a systematic review of an ensemble of different programmes purporting to use the same underlying mechanism. Knowledge resolutions occur as follows. The process starts with programme A, which we discover works in certain expected ways for certain subjects. We accept these findings not only because we are able to show the appropriate correlation but also because we are able to produce a theory of how it works. We then take this explanation to a second programme B, which works ostensibly using the same programme theory. If B performs exactly as predicted, then we have achieved an extension of the scope of the theory. If B has mixed results (as it will) we will need to enlarge, amend and re-specify the theory. The process goes on through an examination of programmes C, D, E etc. This process of theory-contingent transfer (Shadish et al., 1991 ) is depicted in Figure 1 by the curved left and right arrows linking the different initiatives.
Let me breathe life into this abstract description with the use of a primitive example. Let us take the example of the modish policy theme of 'public disclosure of information on performance' -better known as 'naming and shaming'. The policy aim is to identify recalcitrants to their peers/communities in order to shame them into conformity. The idea insinuated itself across the criminal justice field by way of schemes involving: mandatory arrest of men involved in domestic violence; publishing lists of poll-tax non-payers in newspapers; posting-up the names of the barred in locals in the 'pub-watch' campaign; identifying motor vehicle manufacturers whose cars are most easily stolen, and so on. The same goal of abashment-through-public-disclosure then pushed its way through the policy sectors, most notably via the idea of naming failing schools to shame them into self-improvement. A further modification occurred with the publication of 'league tables' to shame under-performing schools into pulling up socks, followed shortly by hospital ratings to entice trusts into pulling down waiting lists. The potential of the idea is limitless and plans are afoot for publicity for polluters, the sullying of smokers, the mortification of molesters and so on.
Even without the benefit of a formal review of the evidence, it is clear that such initiatives meet with mixed success. At one end of the continuum are Ford who have transformed vehicle security following their wooden spoon in the publication of a league-table of 'twoking times' (taking without owners consent) for all makes of cars. At the other end are the many radical poll-tax protesters who were overjoyed when, following non-payment, their names appeared in the local papers. The reason for the inconstant outcomes is fairly obvious. The publication of the Car Crimes Index (www.homeoffice.gov.uk/carcrime/cti99. pdf), together with corresponding hikes in insurance premiums for certain of their models, provides bad press for an organization whose livelihood depends on being on the right side of public esteem. Poll-tax protesters, by contrast, had their anti-establishment credentials embellished by their brief moment in the public gaze. Now, 'Shame belongs to a bundle of "self-conscious emotions": embarrassment, shame, guilt, pride, and pridefulness' (Elster, 1999) . What is happening in some of the negative instances, I would suggest, is that the shaming mechanism has been applied to unsuitable subjects in inappropriate circumstances, resulting in an unanticipated outcome. Many poll-tax protesters were sufficiently on the margins of society that being named was only a source of one of the other selfconscious emotions, namely 'pride'. What we have happened upon here is a specific instance of a venerable bit of social science known as reference-group theory (Merton, 1968 ). Merton's theory compared the 'in-group establishment' with 'out-group marginals', and he was able to explain a whole range of behaviour across many different institutions in terms of these affiliations.
We can engage in some Mertonian hypothesis building by enlarging upon our embryonic theory of public disclosure. It seems that 'antagonistic non-members' are very difficult to shame, whereas 'aspirational members' are particularly sensitive to being named. This hypothesis may be deepened by revisiting it in a further programme. Shaming theory crops up again in another programme, much promoted in the 1990s, taking the form of mandatory arrests in potential cases of domestic violence. In following up any such complaint, the new idea was that police discretion to arrest the suspect should be removed. Apart form re-balancing the justice scales towards the victim, the stratagem was that the alleged perpetrator had to face the ordeal of arrest and the ensuing public shame, represented by neighbourhood gossip about the red face under the blue lamp as the suspect is inserted into patrol car.
Coming to the evaluations of the scheme (Sherman, 1992) , the net impact of mandatory arrests turns out to be close to zero and destined for meta-analytic ignominy. This aggregate outcome, however, disguises two counter-balancing effects. Closer inspection of the data shows that being arrested in the public eye brings shame (and decreased domestic violence) in 'respectable' communities, but provokes anger (and even increased domestic violence) in 'marginal' communities. I will leave it to the reader to invoke the respective thought process of Thomas Toff and Gary Grunge, as the long arm of the law embraces them. The policy implication is that discretionary arrests are, after all, probably quite a good idea, providing that they are based in the correct theory (namely, that outwardly-decent insiders fear shaming's power, but antagonistic outsiders resent shaming by displaying more of the same).
Since this is only a hypothetical example, I breeze over the further complications of mandatory arrest schemes in order to return to the methodological point. What I have tried to show is the process in which examining the same intervention mechanism in just two or three contrasting policy contexts can help prompt a reexamination and re-focusing of programme theory. Further examination of how Evaluation 8(3) (and if) shame impinges on physicians, paedophiles, polluters and public servants would, no doubt, add subtlety to the emerging theory.
A final and crucial point to re-emphasize about this account is the seemingly unorthodox perception of what it means to 'generalize' from an evidence base. Realism eschews the idea of replicating best buys and exemplary cases. Social interventions are so complex that there is little hope of reproducing them lock, stock and barrel and, even if one could, they are so context sensitive that the 'same' assemblage may then go on to misfire. However, what one can do by way of planning in open systems is to gather vast experience of the options and possibilities and to figure out what kinds of things work for what kinds of subjects in what kinds of situations. One can multiply that experience by looking beyond the administrative category and into the essential policy ideas. Such a process may allow the policy maker a better chance of steering clear past mistakes -whilst not, of course, avoiding new ones. Cumulative knowledge about the whos, wheres and whyfores of programme success is not tied to the paraphernalia of each initiative but occurs through a process of abstraction. Realist synthesis thus ends up with theory.
Such a thought might strike terror into the minds of steadfast exponents of EBP, who are usually on an empirical mission to avoid the know-all tendencies of normative theory or the know-nothing aspirations of post-modern sociological theory. I should stress, therefore, that realist synthesis aspires to 'theory' only in its most useful guise: 'middle-range theory'.
Theories that lie between the minor but necessary working hypotheses that evolve in abundance during day-to-day research and the all-inclusive systematic efforts to develop a unified theory that will explain all the observed uniformities of social behaviour, social organization and social change. (Merton, 1968: 39) 
Incentives
This section presents a sketch of what realist synthesis would look like in practice. Note firstly, that the method shares much of the same technical paraphernalia as the mainstream approaches. It begins with the massive exercise of compiling a database, sought and extracted systematically from previous inquiries. Thereafter a 'realist logic' kicks in, which pushes the EBP process in a rather different direction and this is what I concentrate upon here.
I take as my example the oldest and, perhaps, simplest programme on the policy maker's books: the 'give-away' or 'grant' or 'subsidy' or 'loan' or 'premium' or 'reward'. Such incentives have found a place in every policy domain and so might find their way into separate programme reviews in the areas of health, safety, transport, corrections, housing, education, and so on. Realist synthesis is cross-sectoral, so I will review case studies from all of these areas. The locus of comparison in realist synthesis is the programme mechanism and so I begin by identifying the underlying programme theory behind a grand array of incentives. Rarely is the idea to offer money or goods for their own sakes; almost always there is an ulterior motive to change behaviour. Broadly speaking, the anticipated generative mechanism is that the incentive offers deprived subjects the
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In this section I will track the fate of that proposition through a range of applications, following the formula of realist synthesis. All of the applications under discussion meet with mixed success. For each case, I will identify the winners and losers, and try to detect the contextual differences that produce such a division. In making comparisons across different policy domains, I will try to discern some underlying patterns to success and failure. The aim is to try to extract a middlerange theory about optimal conditions for bestowing incentives. I emphasize again that what follows is an embryonic sketch. It will employ pitifully few original studies and the depth of analysis of each one will be minimal, relying in many cases on hunches and bits of hearsay that have come my way. One of the great achievements of meta-evaluation, of whatever code, is the production of indepth and systematic reviews. My effort is as skin-deep and unsystematic as they come; its aim is to demonstrate the promise of a method rather than deliver a solid evidence base.
Six Applications of Incentives

1) Health
Our first application on 'smoking-cessation' can be found as a standalone measure or as part of a more comprehensive package of 'workplace bans', 'information campaigns', 'therapies', 'pricing measures' and so on. The latter are also part of the company it would normally keep in research review. I refer here to Nicotine Replacement Therapy (NRT) and in particular, of course, to initiatives in which it is offered free to subjects as an incentive to begin the process of quitting cigarettes. These operations are often known by titles like 'one week free' schemes and are normally targeted at poorer smokers (www.haznet.org.uk). The underlying programme theory is that NRT is pretty expensive stuff and so by introducing it initially free of charge, the savings made on smoking bills will be substantial enough for subsequent NRT purchases to fall within limited budgets.
The outcomes of such programmes are patchy. Some smokers take the first steps to becoming ex-smokers by continuing with purchases of their own. For others, the single donation is the only real encounter with NRT. No doubt there are a range of reasons for this difference but one decisive contextual condition seems to be the budget balance itself. The programme theory assumes that household finances will be tight, but not that they will be debt-ridden and potentially chaotic. The intended programme mechanism is of an initial rational calculation building itself into long-term behaviour -given the week-free head-start, the saving of £X a week on cigarettes, will actually outweigh next week's outlay of £Y a week on patches, and so reserves are kept ahead of expenditure. Such actuarial logic crumbles in the face of a huge debt of £Z a week, the black-market availability of 'euro-cigs' at £U a week, and the survival technique of making payments to whomsoever presses hardest in that particular week.
Policy makers and practitioners tend to retreat to the drawing board on such
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discoveries and contemplate the utility of 'two weeks free' or 'free NHS prescriptions'. Realist syntheses, however, may withdraw having achieved a little learning and developed a tyro theory about the contextual constraint of the chaotic, highdebt budget (C 1 ) on incentives. We now move across sectors to investigate the matter further.
2) Safety Surveys show that poorer families tend to suffer a high proportion of household fires and their dwellings tend to be less well protected by smoke alarms (Macdonald and Roberts, 1995) . Putting two and two together prompts initiatives in the form of the free distribution of such alarms. Our standard mechanism is applied. The donation of an item not normally part of the spending priorities of a household, if accepted, installed and maintained will offer a long-term difference to home safety. Household fires are rare, so it has proved tough to get hard outcome data on incidents, injuries and deaths in order to evaluate the claim. Process data, however, is mixed and often disappointing, revealing that the alarms are often not properly maintained in the medium to long term -with batteries going missing, dead and without replacement.
We have a ready-made theory to account for such mixed fortunes. In many respects we seem to be repeating case one -alarms are not kept in good repair because they are not a pressing priority in the context of chaotic, high-debt budgets. But this is not the entire story of the negative cases. Batteries, it transpires, often used to go missing on early models because they found a very useful place as a substitute in the TV remote or Walkman. They often go dead and unnoticed in systems without a low-charge warning. They often go without replacement, if there is such a warning, but installation is awkward and if there is no spare to hand. The underlying problem is thus of wit and wisdom as well as wherewithal.
Abstracting away from the particulars of the example, we now have three counter-contexts to threaten the long-term efficacy of incentive programmes.
• (C 1 ) Budgetary constraints.
• (C 2 ) Alternative usage (exchange utility).
• (C 3 ) Technical limitations on usage (durability etc.).
The next task is to put this primitive little theory to work by considering further examples. Before we do so, it is useful to take one step back, in order to see if the negative cases and two additional contexts, provides a further nuance for understanding the NRT example. NRT patches are good for nothing else (as far as I am aware!) so exchange (C 2 ) is out of the equation. Durability and technical constraints (C 3 ), however, are real issues in the replacement of nicotine. The withdrawal regime will not work unless it is staged properly and patch dosage carefully regulated downwards. And, in the chewing-gum version, even the mastication techniques (chew and park) need to be perfected (Thompson and Hunter, 1998) .
3) Corrections
My next example is 'transitional aid for ex-offenders'. I depend for source material here on Rossi et al.'s Money, Work and Crime (1980) . The
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basic idea under scrutiny was that by providing some minimum level of income support during the period immediately following release from prison, the balance of incentives would be changed in favour of employment and against crime. The background to the initiative was the knowledge that securing employment was one of the best safeguards against recidivism and the fact that at the time, in the states involved, ex-convicts were ineligible for unemployment payments. In order to get by, they had to rely on family and friends, who themselves often existed on the fringes of society.
Rossi's research produced one of the classic mixed-findings of evaluation research. The Transitional Aid (TA) experiment 'failed' in that the experimental group receiving the grant re-offended at exactly the same rate as the nonsubsidized control group. Basically, the authors argued for a 'counter-balancing' explanation of this perverse outcome, in which TA does have an 'incentive effect' reducing the need to generate income from crime, but that it also has a 'disincentive effect' reducing the need to find work to survive. Realist synthesis goes in search of the contexts that differentiate the two outcomes: what kinds of exoffenders and what kinds of situations are associated with positive or negative use of the incentive?
Two notions from our previous examples are helpful in explaining the negative consequences of the TA project. Ex-offenders have the most chaotic of budgets (C 1 ) and the cash payments have 'total' exchange utility (C 2 ). The 'failure' of the aid payments is thus readily explained -the grants could quite as easily go towards 'avoiding work' or 'feeding a drug habit' or for that matter 'planning better crimes' as to the intended outcome. But what we also need from the source research are some contextual niches in which these glum consequences are overcome.
Rossi et al.'s research provides a few such clues. Numbering amongst the more successful sub-groups of ex-felons were those returning to families after imprisonment. Such a scenario increased the number of those involved in the daily decision about whether TA is to be used for 'work', 'rest' or 'play'. It seems that just a small dose of domestic democracy provided a conducive context to accentuate the programme's more positive consequences. In the same way we know that the support provided by a non-smoking household is helpful to a great variety of smoking-cessation initiatives. We might attempt a more abstract, transferable hypothesis along these lines by developing the idea that 'widening ownership' (C 4 ) of a give-away, grant or subsidy will increases its positive consequences. Another line of advance from the Corrections' case is even more obvious. Initiatives previous to the one investigated by Rossi et al., which had excluded prisoners with a history of drug or alcohol abuse, had generally shown rather more positive results than in his landmark TA inquiry. This invites us to ponder the looming idea that the closure of alternative markets (C 5 ) for incentives might be another key context for their successful application.
For ease of exposition let me add to the list these two additional contextual constraints on incentivization.
• (C 4 ) Democratizing ownership.
• (C 5 ) Interference from rival markets.
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4) Transport Our next case study provides a brutal domain contrast in order to refine further our knowledge of some of the significant contexts already emerging. Incentive mechanisms also crop up with communal aims like reducing congestion and pollution. These also tend to meet with mixed success and 'free city-centre bike loan' schemes provide another example of the schizophrenic initiative. They are hugely popular but not long-lived, with damage and disappearance of the bikes being the main stumbling blocks (www.ibike.org/ freebike.htm). Despite the fact that we are dealing with a 'loan' targeted publicly rather than at specific individuals, many of the same contextual constraints apply. Thus bikes, even when painted distinctively, have some exchange utility (C 2 ) if stolen or 'commandeered' for private usage. The free good, alas, is not loved and cherished as are privately owned items and so repair and damage costs often exceed budget expectations (C 3 ). Perhaps most surprising of all is the suggestion (personal communication from 'inspector X') that, in some tourist localities, private bike hire firms already in the market (C 5 ) are responsible for some of the 'difficulties' that obtain in fleet maintenance in the public schemes.
The most interesting comparison, however, lies in the matter of ownership. From the previous case it was inferred that widening ownership (C 4 ) could lead to more prudent use of transitional aid. Even in that example, the hypothesis is a qualified one, and assumes that the widening circle was a virtuous one (the family) rather than a vicious one (the gang). The present scheme, of course, is already publicly owned, and thus requires qualifications to be applied in the opposite direction. How 'open' should open-access be? 'Free at the point of usage' schemes present us a variation on C 4 , namely 'ownership ambiguity'. We do not know if the person taking the bike will park it at one of the designated exchange points, squirrel it away for a return journey, or ride off into the sunset. Thus certain schemes have followed a path to forms of rationing or targeting (C 6 ), namely some form of limited access to 'designated users'. The alternative is to surround the scheme by another, somewhat incongruous context namely 'surveillance' in other words to utilize something like a 'warden scheme' or its modern day equivalent in 'intelligent parking stands' and 'bikes with chips' (C 7 ). Added to the record are these.
• (C 6 ) Demarcating users.
• (C 7 ) Policing the incentive.
5) Housing
One of the earliest forms of public subsidy takes the form of the 'property improvement grant'. Again the basic mechanism applies. Housing, naturally enough, takes a sizeable share of most household budgets and the idea is to provide a subsidy (on, e.g. insulation, roofing or damp-proofing) that will 'pay for itself' in the longer term, thus allowing poorer recipients the chance to improve quality of life in other respects. And, once again, we have a popular policy somewhat stymied by mixed results (Leather, 2000) .
Such schemes suffer most of our standard contextual constraints. We are back again with (C 1 ) and the attempts to apply incentives into the chaotic budget. Most housing schemes take the form of subsidy rather than give-away and so involve the 'savings in the future' calculation that bedevilled our first example. There is
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the possibility of exchange utility (C 2 ) with a tendency of some building materials to 'walk' from usage in the designated dwellings. Durability (C 3 ) and failure to protect from rival markets (C 5 ) are also problems, with the schemes attracting the dismal efforts of 'cowboy' builders, offering to take on paper work involved and keep any subsidiary costs low. And this was followed, as it often is, with increased surveillance (C 7 ) of the scheme.
The main problem with these schemes, however, was take-up and targeting (C 6 ). The schemes were intended for the poorest households and most inadequate dwellings, but that is not always where they ended up. At this point we can introduce another classic contextual difficulty, namely 'bureaucratic impediments' in targeting and limiting demand. This is actually a sub-aspect of context (C 6 ) but I will keep the nomenclature simple by calling it (C 8 ). The improvement grants were usually means-tested but those without financial means are also often those without the nous or grace to pursue them. Inveterate form-fillers, however, even though on the upper margins of income qualification, often ended up with the foam-filled lofts. We add this to the checklist.
• (C 8 ) Bureaucratic constraints on accessing incentive.
One response to the mixed results of property improvement grants came in the form of group repairs. This is known in the housing trade as 'enveloping' and in the realist synthesis trade as 'widening ownership' (C 4 ). Rather than individual dwellings being targeted, a whole terrace or street or estate is selected for collective improvement. And in these cases the programme theory is also extended, going beyond the idea of freeing-up householder's resources and being extended to include decreasing resident turnover and strengthening community pride. Enveloping, needless to say, has met with mixed success. Cowboys are corralled and loads remain on lorries, by and large, with the letting of central contracts. But group-repairs are expensive, they sometimes lead to duplication of work already carried out, and they can promote envy in neighbouring localities. These differences follow, perhaps, from a further subtle change in programme context. Whilst enveloping 'widens' ownership of a scheme, it also 'externalizes' control of the incentive to the local authority or housing association (C 9 ).
• (C 9 ) External controls on ownership of the incentive.
6) Education
My final example is of schemes aimed at 'widening participation' (WP) in higher education. The familiar mechanism resurfaces in another guise. An incentive in the form of an enhanced grant for disadvantaged students will enable them to enjoy (eventually) the benefits of being well qualified for a worthwhile career. These days provision is likely to take the form of exemption from fee payment rather than the award of grant cheque but the same reasoning applies, as does the crop of contextual constraints. As ever, the actual configuration of the limitations is slightly different. This is especially so in this case since WP policy in the UK has moved the spotlight over the years from an individual focus (incentives paid to poorer students) to an institutional one (incentives for universities to recruit and retain 'non-standard' students). Rather than tell the
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tale chronologically or by prioritizing the key contextual constraints, I will use this case as a 'summary' and simply follow the various Cs mechanically as they have emerged in our cross-domain travels.
(C1) Chaotic budgets As we have seen, the classic bugbear of incentivization occurs when funding is offered within an 'unpredictable' budget to offset 'partial' costs in the name of 'indeterminate' future benefits. All of this is exemplified in offering a student grant to low-income subjects (Archer and Hutchings, 2000) .
(C2) Exchange utility The current popular idiom for a 'student' is a 'tax dodger'. The pinch of truth behind the stereotype is that loans or grants come with tax advantages, they have high exchange utility and thus may fund elements of student lifestyle more to do with Saturnalia than with scholarship. Nonstandard students have above average drop-out rates. Although this is probably more to do with the 'cold-shoulder' than the 'knees-up', the fact remains that the cash incentive may often be used for purposes other than that intended.
(C3) Technical problems and durability These are a lesser problem for WP incentives -unless one happens to be on the end of a bureaucratic muddle (e.g. a lone-parent on the receiving end of late-payment of this semester's much needed loan).
(C4) Widening ownership Many universities failed to follow up WP initiatives on admissions with modifications to their classic 'hands-off' teaching and learning practices. We have met the problem several times before -the incentive to the subject cannot overcome wider societal inertia. We also have met the response before -if ownership of the policy can be spread, then its objectives are more likely to be achieved. Accordingly agencies like the Higher Education Funding Council in England have recently formulated a battery of WP initiatives aimed at institutions as well as individuals, amongst them being another form of incentive known as the 'widening participation premium'.
(C5) Rival markets The present WP incentives in the UK have been offered against a background of rapid expansion of the Higher Education (HE) sector and a generally rosy economic climate. Under such conditions the economic punch of being a 'graduate' is muted, as is the attraction of the incentive.
(C6) Demarcating users The WP premium to universities is targeted at 'under-represented' groups. The revenue raised on student numbers is increased for every student admitted from deprived areas (the relevant postcodes being identified from a prior GIS analysis, see www.hefce.ac.uk/perfind.2000). Wisely, the expectation is that the enhanced system of subsidies will still not work across the entire HE spectrum. The university response to the incentives could vary from using the additional funding for root-and-branch reform of 'student support' to mere 'premium chasing' by ensuring that admissions officers are well equipped with the relevant postcode information.
(C7) Policing the incentive My earlier examples suggested that easily monitored incentives work best. Distinguishing WP premium chasing from WP capacity building is difficult to say the least.
(C8) Bureaucratic constraints The UK system (for low-income individuals) for obtaining financial support is part of the same apparatus that administers student loans and was set up at the same time as the widespread introduction of Pawson: Evidence-based Policy: The Promise of 'Realist Synthesis' HE tuition fees. Amidst this administrative haze, the (mistaken) perception that fee payment was mandatory is said to have had significant responsibility for the low uptake of WP incentives.
(C9) Externalizing controls Spreading the points for receipt of WP incentives may be, according to our tyro theory, a double-edged sword. In the UK the jury is still out on whether the various premiums on offer have created WP or just a 'WP industry'.
I hope that these truncated examples begin to make the case for realist synthesis. If applied researchers are prepared to work at this middle level of abstraction, then definite benefits flow. Stage one of the case is quite evident from this miniature review: not only do these programmes share common mechanisms for change, but the obstacles inhibiting their success also repeat themselves over and again in different policy domains, and much is to be learned by mapping the shared impediments. Stage two, I trust, also begins to reveal itself: success depends on having the right configurations of subjects and circumstances in place. Subsidizing those with chaotic budgets will require further 'tweaking' of initiatives, and the incorporation of other programme facets like 'widening ownership' or 'targeting' or 'policing'. The precise combinations will always be context dependent but research should be able to identify a range of positive, middle-range configurations. Stage three of realist synthesis lies latent in the present example. The trust that researchers place in the various propositions emerging from such reviews lies not only in evidence from the cases under review. We accept some of these theories because they are already familiar in other types of studies in other disciplines. Some of the explanations above call on middle-range ideas from rational choice theory, reference group theory and so on (Pawson, 2000) . A proper synthesis would bring these extant theories much more clearly into view. Research reviews are not delivered to a tabula rasa. Theory and evidence work best when they meet in the middle.
Conclusion
To summarize, the process of systematic review, research synthesis, meta-analysis, or whatever we eventually choose to call it, is absolutely vital to evidence-based policy development. It embodies the key principle of building initiatives by learning from past successes and failures. It involves no battles with gatekeepers, no sampling of stakeholders, no idle control groups, no observation of subjects, no long-term follow-ups, and indeed no programmes to run and maintain (and is thus remarkably cheap!). A circumspect blend of the old and the new (demonstration projects and systematic review) should be de rigueur as the basis for all policy and programme development. It has to be acknowledged, however, that the issue of finding the precise criterion for making meta-evaluative judgements has yet to be solved. This pair of articles has cautioned against the two poles of the ruthless arithmetic extraction of 'net success' and the intuitive extraction of 'exemplars' as guides to best practice and hopefully provided some pointers to a potentially more profitable 'third way'.
If the argument here is correct, even approximately, then what is needed is to
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move beyond the promissory example developed here. A sustained study on incentives could easily follow along the lines suggested. And, after that, a side step into some of the other major policy mechanisms is not difficult to envisage. Policies and programmes are aimed at bringing about individual and social change by any means legal, decent, honest, truthful. And yet policy makers and practitioners are, in truth, able to offer relatively few ways of inducing change (the assertion here is not meant to reflect upon the lack of imagination of programme architects but on the limited nature of the incentives they may draw upon). The result is that the same programme theories repeat themselves from initiative to initiative and jump from domain to domain. Realist synthesis thus has plenty of scope in investigating 'zero tolerance', 'naming and shaming', 'joint working', 'performance targeting', 'private-public partnerships' and so on. Once we had a few realist-synthesis studies under our belts then, no doubt, the technical difficulties that confront any method would begin to emerge. Two spring to mind immediately. The key atom of evidence, by my calculation, is when the source research is able to demonstrate the circumstances that blunt the effectiveness of a particular policy mechanism. It is well known that journal conventions can get in the way of effective reviews and two of the best known customs are excluding accounts of programme failure and saving space by minimizing contextual information in general. Just how damaging such factors are, we will have to wait and see, though Petrosino (2000) gives a good indication of how tough a task it will be. The second issue is the sixty-four-thousand-dollar question about the reception of a realist-inspired evidence base in policy circles. The offer would be a tale of caution delivered at a modest level of abstraction. Whilst I have tried to show that such an account is more realistic than the naming of best buys and exemplars, what influence it would bring to bear in the policy arena is another matter. We will have to wait and see.
